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Abstract 
This paper explores whether investor sentiment has an adverse impact on corporate 
investment decisions and whether such impact, if present, can be effectively mitigated by 
sound corporate governance mechanisms. The sample comprises listed firms in Taiwan 
between 2003 and 2010. Empirical results indicate that investor sentiment is significantly and 
positively related to amount of new investment and over-investment. Investor sentiment has 
an adverse impact on corporate investment decisions. Further test for the moderating effect of 
corporate governance confirms that corporate governance mechanisms can mitigate such 
adverse impact of investor sentiment on corporate investment decisions. The empirical results 
support the argument of previous literature that corporate governance has both incentive and 
monitoring effects on managers’ decision-making. Due to the agency problem, managers’ 
investment decisions may be affected by investor sentiment and deviate from the goal of 
maximizing firm value. Therefore, firms should reinforce their corporate governance 
mechanisms to minimize the adverse impact of investor sentiment.  
Keywords: Corporate Governance; Board of Director Mechanisms; Agency Theory; Investor 
Sentiment; Investment Decision 
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1.  Introduction 
Classical financial theory assumes that investors are rational. The efficient market hypothesis 
suggests that share prices reflect all the information of a firm. However, recent studies show 
that investors are actually not rational and will be driven by emotional factors to make wrong 
investment decisions (e.g., Cornelli, Goldreich, & Ljungqvist, 2006; De Long, Shleifer, 
Summers, & Waldmann, 1990; Dorn, 2009; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). The presence of 
sentimental investors makes a firm’s share price deviate from its fundamentals. In other 
words, a firm’s share price is determined by not only its fundamentals but also investor 
sentiment. It has been documented in many studies that investor sentiment also has an impact 
on manager decisions (Baker, Stein, & Wurgler, 2003; Baker & Wurgler, 2004; Dong, 
Hirshleifer, & Teoh, 2007; Gilchrist, Himmelberg, & Huberman, 2005; Polk & Sapienza, 
2009). Therefore, this paper will explore whether investor sentiment has an adverse impact 
on corporate investment decisions and further examine whether such impact, if present, can 
be mitigated by sound corporate governance mechanisms.   
Making investment decisions is an important activity in firm management. For sustainable 
operations, firms need to constantly expand and innovate their facilities and products. 
Investment decisions concern the allocation and use of resources and funds, usually in a large 
amount. A wrong decision can pose a serious threat to the survival of the firm. Hence, careful 
assessment of investment decisions is of high importance to firms. However, recent studies 
(e.g., Baker et al., 2003; Dong et al., 2007) have found that managers do not always make 
investment decisions in the interest of shareholders. The empirical finding in Baker et al. 
(2003) shows that the irrational element of stock prices may affect corporate investment 
through an equity financing channel. Through this equity financing channel, mispricing 
caused by investor sentiment has a positive effect on investment level, particularly among 
highly equity-dependent firms. In addition to the equity financing channel, investor sentiment 
can also affect investment decisions through a catering channel (Grundy & Li, 2010; Kau, 
Linck, & Rubin, 2008; Morck, Shleifer, Vishny, Shapiro, & Poterba, 1990; Polk & Sapienza, 
2009). Managers may increase firm investment to cater to the optimistic (pessimistic) 
sentiment of investors (McConnell & Muscarella, 1985). In doing so, they can achieve a 
quick boost of the firm’s stock price and earn higher salary or compensation for themselves.   
Managers operate the firm for firm owners. Hired by the firm, they are supposed to pursue 
maximum interest of shareholders. However, due to the agency problem, some managers may 
shirk or act in their own best interests (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). No matter through which 
channel investor sentiment motivate managers to make decisions that lead to over-investment 
or under-investment, such decisions are detrimental to firm value. Previous research has 
obtained abundant evidence that sound corporate governance mechanisms can mitigate the 
agency problem and further increase firm performance and shareholder wealth (e.g., Agrawal 
& Knoeber, 1996; Core, Guay, & Rusticus, 2006; Cremers & Nair, 2005). Based on this 
perspective, this paper will examine whether corporate governance mechanisms can induce or 
force managers to act toward maximization of firm value regardless of investor sentiment.   
The main contributions of this paper are as follows: First, many studies have shown that 
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mispricing caused by investor sentiment affects managers’ investment decisions. This paper 
further examines whether corporate governance can moderate the relation between investor 
sentiment and investment decisions. Second, previous research of the impact of investor 
sentiment on investment decisions uses investment level as the main dependent variable. This 
paper employs the over-investment (under-investment) model introduced by Richardson 
(2006) to estimate the amount of over-investment and test whether investor sentiment has an 
adverse impact on investment decisions. Third, based on Baker & Wurgler’s (2006) 
methodology, this paper develops a composite index of investor sentiment through principal 
component analysis. Four proxy variables, including stock turnover, number of IPOs, 
consumer confidence index (CCI), and discretionary accruals are considered in the analysis. 
This composite index can better represent investor sentiment as it contains not only the 
market-wide and firm-level investor sentiment index but also the direct and indirect investor 
sentiment index. Fourth, due to the diversity and interchangeability of corporate governance 
mechanisms (Bathala & Rao, 1995), the quality of a firm’s corporate governance cannot be 
judged simply by the effectiveness of a single mechanism. This paper follows the method 
used by Bushman, Chen, Engel, and Smith (2004) and Young and Wu (2009) to integrate 
various corporate governance variables into a composite index of corporate governance. With 
this index, this paper further examines whether corporate governance mechanisms can 
mitigate the adverse impact of investor sentiment on investment decisions.   
Our empirical results indicate that investor sentiment has an impact on corporate investment 
level. Firms tend to invest more when investors are more optimistic. Investment decisions 
that fluctuate with investor sentiment will result in abnormal firm investment. Managers are 
likely to over-invest when they increase their firm’s investment under the influence of 
investor sentiment (no matter through the equity financing channel or through the catering 
channel). Excessive investment of resources into projects with little benefit for the firm will 
cause a persisting decline of firm value. As to the moderating effect of corporate governance, 
empirical evidence shows that increase of investment level and over-investment induced by 
the optimism of investors can be mitigated in the presence of effective corporate governance 
mechanisms. In other words, sound corporate governance mechanisms can offer positive 
incentives and constraints to managers to avoid the agency problem.   
2.  Theoretical Background and Hypotheses 
2.1 Investor Sentiment and Investment Decisions 
Investor sentiment affects stock prices, causing a deviation of stock prices from fundamentals 
(Baker & Wurgler, 2006, 2007; Baker, Wurgler, & Yuan, 2012; Lemmon & Portniaguina, 
2006; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). When investors are optimistic, they may overlook negative 
information and overreact to positive information, resulting in overvaluation of stock prices. 
Conversely, when investors are pessimistic, they may overlook positive information and 
overreact to negative information, resulting in undervaluation of stock prices. Investor 
sentiment causes mispricing, which in turn affects a firm’s investment level through two main 
channels, namely the equity financing channel and the catering channel.   
Keynes (1936) argues that stock prices contain an important element of irrationality. This 
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element influences a firm’s financing decisions and further investment decisions. Many 
studies have studied the equity financing channel through which managers’ investment 
decisions are affected (Blanchard, Rhee, & Summers, 1993; Bosworth, Hymans, & 
Modigliani, 1975; Fischer & Merton, 1984; Morck et al., 1990; Stein, 1996). Stein (1996), for 
instance, proposes a model of equity financing channel in which mispricing of a firm’s stock 
causes changes in the financing conditions for the firm. The cost of equity financing for the 
firm is lower when its stock is overpriced. According to the market timing theory, managers 
will issue stocks to get finance. They increase the firm’s investment after gaining sufficient 
finance for investment. If they invest without careful assessment, they may waste resources 
on projects with a negative net present value (NPV), which is a phenomenon called 
over-investment. If the firm’s stock price is under-estimated, the cost of equity financing will 
be higher for the firm. In this case, managers will not issue stocks. They may reduce their 
firm’s investment and even drop projects with a positive NPV, which is a phenomenon called 
under-investment. Therefore, mispricing is positively related to investment level and 
over-investment. This relation is particularly evident among highly equity-dependent firms. 
Baker et al. (2003) use empirical data to test Stein’s (1996) model. Their findings reveal that 
investment level is positively related to the element of irrationality, and this relation is 
especially strong among highly equity-dependent firms. Based on Baker et al.’s (2003) 
research design, Chang, Tam, Tan, and Wong (2007) draw upon a large panel of Australian 
firms to investigate if mispricing caused by investor sentiment has an impact on investment 
level. Their finding supports that investor sentiment affects corporate investment through the 
equity financing channel. Dong et al. (2007) also find that capital expenditure and research 
and development expenditure increase with mispricing among overvalued firms.   
The equity financing channel hypothesis states that investor sentiment affects firm investment 
through the market timing for equity offerings. The effect of investor sentiment on firm 
investment is indirect. According to this hypothesis, firms with a huge amount of internal 
funds or a high debt capacity do not need to obtain finance for investment from the equity 
market. In other words, their investment decisions are not susceptible to fluctuation of stock 
prices. In addition to the equity financing channel, many studies have found that investor 
sentiment also affects firm investment through the catering channel (Grundy & Li, 2010; Kau 
et al., 2008; Morck et al., 1990; Polk & Sapienza, 2009). They state that mispricing affects 
investment decisions when managers have an incentive to cater to the optimistic (or 
pessimistic) sentiment of investors, even in the absence of high equity dependence. Due to 
information asymmetry, potential investors value a firm based on their observation of the 
firm’s investment behavior (Chan, Martin, & Kensinger, 1990; Chung, Wright, & 
Charoenwong, 1998; McConnell & Muscarella, 1985; Trueman, 1986). According to the 
catering theory, when investors are optimistic but managers refuse to invest in projects 
favored by the investors, the investors may sell their shares, causing a slump of the firm’s 
stock price. Therefore, managers will choose to increase (decrease) investment to cater to the 
optimistic (pessimistic) sentiment of investors to maximize the firm’s share price in a short 
time and earn higher salary or compensation for themselves. However, over-investment and 
under-investment are likely to occur when managers overly cater to investor sentiment. Polk 
and Sapienza (2009) use discretionary accruals as a proxy for mispricing caused by investor 
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sentiment to test if corporate investment caters to investor sentiment. Their empirical finding 
suggests a significant and positive relation between corporate investment and discretionary 
accruals. Grundy and Li (2010) also empirically confirm that managers seeking to maximize 
short-term shareholder value may increase corporate investment that caters to investor 
sentiment. Besides, if there is a high level of investor optimism, a higher share of ownership 
may provide managers with an incentive to over-invest. Based on the above theories and 
discussions, this paper proposes the following hypotheses:  
Hypothesis 1: A higher level of investor optimism leads to more new investment.  
Hypothesis 2: A higher level of investor optimism leads to more over-investment.   
2.2 Investor Sentiment, Corporate Governance Mechanisms, and Investment Decisions 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) propose the agency theory, suggesting that due to separation of 
ownership and management, managers may put aside the interest of shareholders while 
seeking their own interest. Investment expenditure is an important corporate decision and 
usually involves a huge amount of money. However, the agency problem may occur when 
managers make investment decisions that do not best serve the interest of shareholders but 
their own interest. Jensen (1986) puts forth the “over-investment” problem, a problem that 
occurs when managers do not seek maximization of shareholder wealth but personal interests, 
such as social reputation, higher reward or more compensation, through continuous firm 
expansion. If the free cash flow is large, managers are also more likely to invest in negative 
NPV projects. Such investment, called over-investment, will further decrease the firm’s value 
and harm the interest of shareholders.   
The incentives and monitoring mechanisms of corporate governance can mitigate the agency 
problem. Theoretically, corporate governance has a positive effect on firm value and the 
quality of managerial decision-making. However, the extant empirical research has mixed 
conclusions about the impact of corporate governance on the quality of managers’ investment 
decisions. The finding of Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2007) suggests that firms with better 
corporate governance are more efficient in acquisition. Huang, Huang, and Chang (2011) 
point out that corporate governance offer monitoring mechanisms which can ensure that 
managers make better investment decisions and avoid the over-investment problem. Both 
Harford, Mansi, and Maxwell (2008) and Richardson (2006) reveal that firms with poor 
corporate governance tend to have greater industry-adjusted investment. Bertrand and 
Mullainathan (2003) and Giroud and Mueller (2010) find that poor corporate governance 
results in under-investment. However, Richardson (2006) argues that only a small portion of 
corporate governance mechanisms can effectively mitigate over-investment.   
Mispricing caused by investor sentiment can cause an increase in firm investment or even 
over-investment through the equity financing channel or the catering channel. According to 
the agency theory, sound corporate governance mechanisms offer incentives and monitoring 
effects that can lead and force managers to make decisions in pursuit of higher firm value. 
Assume that investors have a high degree of optimism, and managers obtain a large cash flow 
due to market timing. Firms with better corporate governance mechanisms may be able to 
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motivate and compel their managers to make proper investment decisions and avoid 
over-investment in negative NPV projects. Moreover, they can also motivate and compel 
their managers not to over-invest only to cater to investor sentiment. Based on the above 
discussions, this paper proposes the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 3: In the presence of better corporate governance mechanisms, the effect of 
investor sentiment on new investment is smaller.  
Hypothesis 4: In the presence of better corporate governance mechanisms, the effect of 
investor sentiment on over-investment (under-investment) is smaller.  
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data and Sample Selection 
This paper draws on a sample comprising publicly listed firms in Taiwan from 2003 to 2010. 
Firms in the financial industry and firms with missing variables are excluded from the sample. 
The final sample includes 7745 firm-year observations. The values of Consumer Confidence 
Index (CCI) are obtained from the monthly survey conducted by The Research Center for 
Taiwan Economic Development, National Central University. The data of other variables of 
investor sentiment, corporate governance, and investment decision (including basic firm data, 
stock price, stock trading volume, IPO data, ownership structure, board composition, and 
financial reports) are obtained from Taiwan Economic Journal (TEJ).    
3.2 Empirical Model 
The proposed hypotheses are tested using the following regression models. In Equation (1), 
the independent variable is investor sentiment (SENTI), and the dependent variable is new 
investment (INVEST). This equation is intended to examine the relation between investor 
sentiment and new investment level. In Equation (2), the independent variable is investor 
sentiment (SENTI), and the dependent variable is over-investment (under-investment) 
(OVERINVEST). This equation examines the relation between investor sentiment and 
over-investment. Both Equation (3) and Equation (4) contain an interaction term of investor 
sentiment and corporate governance (SENTI*CGI) to test the relation of investor sentiment to 
investment level and over-investment under different levels of corporate governance. The 
selection and measurement of each variable is explained as follows. The operational 
definition of all the variables is provided in Table 1.  
ܫܸܰܧܵ ௜ܶ,௧ = ߚ଴ + ߚଵܵܧܰܶܫ௜,௧ + ߚଶܥܨ௜,௧ + ߚଷܳ௜,௧ିଵ + ߚସܵܫܼܧ௜,௧ + ߝ௜,௧																																																							(1) 
ܱܸܧܴܫܸܰܧܵ ௜ܶ,௧ = ߚ଴ + ߚଵܵܧܰܶܫ௜,௧ + ߚଶܥܨ௜,௧ + ߚଷܳ௜,௧ିଵ + ߚସܵܫܼܧ௜,௧ + ߝ௜,௧																																									 (2) 
					ܫܸܰܧܵ ௜ܶ,௧ = ߚ଴ + ߚଵܵܧܰܶܫ௜,௧ + ߚଶܥܩܫ௜,௧ + ߚଷܵܧܰܶܫ௜,௧ ∗ ܥܩܫ௜,௧ + ߚସܥܨ௜,௧ 
				+ߚହܳ௜,௧ିଵ + ߚ଺ܵܫܼܧ௜,௧ + ߝ௜,௧																																																																																																				(3) 
				ܱܸܧܴܫܸܰܧܵ ௜ܶ,௧ = ߚ଴ + ߚଵܵܧܰܶܫ௜,௧ + ߚଶܥܩܫ௜,௧ + ߚଷܵܧܰܶܫ௜,௧ ∗ ܥܩܫ௜,௧ + ߚସܥܨ௜,௧		 
			+ߚହܳ௜,௧ିଵ 	+ ߚ଺ܵܫܼܧ௜,௧ + ߝ௜,௧																																																																																									(4) 
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3.3 Variables Definitions and Measurement 
3.3.1 Investment Variables 
In this paper, the dependent variables include new investment (INVEST) and over-investment 
(OVERINVEST). According to Richardson (2006) and Strong and Meyer (1990), total 
investment expenditure is the sum of all outlays on capital expenditure, acquisitions, and 
research and development less receipts from the sale of property, plant, and equipment. Total 
investment expenditure can be broken down into required investment expenditure to maintain 
assets in place (for which amortization and depreciation can be used as the proxy) and 
investment expenditure on new projects. Hence, new investment (INVEST) is total investment 
expenditure minus amortization and depreciation expense. To estimate the amount of 
over-investment, this paper employs the method introduced by Richardson (2006). The 
expected level of new investment is estimated using Equation (5). The fitted value from the 
regression is the estimate of the expected level of new investment. And the residual from the 
regression is the estimate of over-investment. The residual can be negative or positive. 
Positive (negative) values denote over-investment (under-investment).  
	ܫܸܰܧܵ ௜ܶ,௧ = ߚ଴ + ߚଵܩܴܱܹܶܪ௜,௧ିଵ + ߚଶܮܧܸܧܴܣܩܧ௜,௧ିଵ + ߚଷܥܣܵܪ௜,௧ିଵ 
																															+ߚସܮ݊(ܣܩܧ)௜,௧ିଵ + ߚହܮ݊(ܵܫܼܧ)௜,௧ିଵ+ߚ଺ܱܵܶܥܭ	ܴܧܴܷܶ ௜ܰ,௧ିଵ	+ߚ଻ܫܸܰܧܵ ௜ܶ,௧ିଵ 
+∑ܻ݁ܽݎ	ܫ݊݀݅cܽݐ݋ݎ 	+ ∑ ܫ݊݀ݑݏݐݎݕ	ܫ݊݀݅ܿܽݐ݋ݎ + ߝ௜,௧																																												      (5) 
3.3.2 Investor Sentiment Variables 
To examine whether an individual firm’s investment decisions are affected by investor 
sentiment, we need to capture firm-specific investor sentiment. Based on the methodology of 
previous research (e.g., Baker & Wurgler, 2006; Polk & Sapienza, 2009), this paper uses 
individual stock turnover (TURN) and discretionary accruals (DACCR) as proxies of investor 
sentiment at the firm level. In addition, number of IPOs (NIPO) and Consumer Confidence 
Index (CCI) are used as proxies for investor sentiment at the market level. Each investor 
sentiment proxy is likely to include a sentiment component as well as some idiosyncratic, 
non-sentiment-related components. Following Baker and Wurgler (2006), this paper performs 
principal component analysis to isolate the common components. The development of each 
proxy variable for investor sentiment and how we build a composite index of investor 
sentiment (SENTI) is explained as follows.  
In this paper, we use four proxy variables of investor sentiment, including TURN, DACCR, 
NIPO, and CCI. First of all, we estimate the first principal component of the four proxies and 
their lags. This gives us a first-stage index with eight loadings, one for each of the current and 
lagged proxies. We then compute the correlation between the first-stage index and the current 
and lagged values of each of the proxies. Finally, we define SENTI as the first principal 
component of the correlation matrix of four variables—each respective proxy’s lead or lag, 
whichever has the higher correlation with the first-stage index. This procedure produces a 
composite index of investor sentiment as follows. The first principal component explains 
43.94% of the sample variance.  
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SENTI t=0.7057 NIPOt-1+0.0674 DACCR t-1+0.0400 TURN t-1+0.7041 CCI t-1 
Stock Turnover (TURN). Baker and Stein (2004) indicate that turnover can serve as a proxy 
for investor sentiment. When irrational investors are optimistic, they participate in the market 
and thus increase the turnover. Following this idea, Baker and Wurgler (2006) include the 
market turnover variable in their composite sentiment index to test the relationship between 
investor sentiment and the cross-section of stock returns. In this paper, we use stock turnover 
as a proxy for the sentiment of irrational investors. High turnover denotes that investors are 
optimistic about the firm, and low turnover denotes that investors are pessimistic about the 
firm.   
Discretionary Accruals (DACCR). The optimism of investors causes overpricing of a stock. 
Sloan (1996) and Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998) find that firms with higher discretionary 
accruals have lower abnormal returns in the long run and therefore infer that the current stock 
prices of these firms are overpriced. Chi and Gupta (2009) and Polk and Sapienza (2009) also 
use discretionary accruals as a proxy for sentiment-induced mispricing. Based on these 
studies, we also view discretionary accruals as one of the proxies for investor sentiment. High 
(low) discretionary accruals indicate the current stock prices are overpriced (underpriced) and 
investors are optimistic (pessimistic). We estimate discretionary accruals using the method 
introduced by Polk and Sapienza (2009).   
Number of IPOs (NIPO). The IPO market is often viewed as sensitive to investor sentiment. 
According to the market timing theory, managers offer IPOs when stock trading is highly 
active and their stock prices are overpriced (Baker & Wurgler, 2002; Lucas & McDonald, 
1990). It can be inferred that investors are more optimistic when the number of IPOs is 
greater.    
Consumer Confidence Index (CCI). The Research Center for Taiwan Economic 
Development, National Central University, surveys consumer confidence index (CCI) on a 
monthly basis. Unlike the other three indices which evaluate investment sentiment based on 
indirect data, CCI directly measures the degree to which investors are optimistic about the 
future. CCI is a direct index of investor sentiment. We use this index as a proxy for investor 
sentiment. CCI considers six factors, including consumers’ confidence for investment in the 
next six months, timing of buying durables, household economic conditions, domestic price 
level, domestic employment opportunities, and the economic climate. The values of this 
index fall between 0~200. Values above 100 denote investors are optimistic, and values 
below 100 denote investors are pessimistic. Higher CCI indicates higher investor optimism 
(Qiu & Welch, 2004).    
3.3.3 Corporate Governance Variables 
Bathala and Rao (1995) point out that many mechanisms of corporate governance can be 
substituted for one another, so a firm’s corporate governance cannot be measured by the 
effectiveness of only one of the mechanisms. In order to take into account a wider spectrum 
of variables of corporate governance, we adopt the method used by Bushman et al. (2004), 
Cheng, Gul, Tong, and Tsui (2008), and Young and Wu (2009). This method is to combine 
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various corporate governance variables into one composite variable to assess the quality of 
corporate governance. We first select four variables related to board composition to measure 
the monitoring effects of corporate governance, including the efficiency and independence of 
monitoring. In addition, we select three variables concerning ownership structure to measure 
the incentive effects of corporate governance, including the incentive for board monitoring 
and the incentive for the controlling shareholder to reduce expropriation. Finally, we combine 
these seven variables into one composite corporate governance index (CGI). The variables in 
each of the two constructs are explained as follows:  
Board Composition. Four variables of board composition are considered, including board 
size (BODSIZE), chairman duality (DUALITY), ratio of outside directors (OUTBOD), and 
presence of independent directors or supervisors (IND). Jensen (1993) and Yermack (1996) 
have noted that when the board size is too large, incongruence of opinions and conflict of 
interest are likely to occur and further slash the effectiveness of board monitoring. We sort all 
the total numbers of directors on the board in descending order and compute the percentile of 
each value. At last, each percentile is converted into a BODSIZE value between 0~1. In 
Taiwan, 76% of listed firms are family firms, and 66.45% are fully controlled by the largest 
family shareholder (Yeh, 1999). Because family members hold decisive shares, agency 
problem is likely to occur between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders in 
family firms. If the director of the board is simultaneously served by a family member or the 
ultimate controller, the independence and monitoring effect of the board may be 
compromised. The board can better supervise the manager without chairman duality. 
Therefore, we set DUALITY as a dummy variable. The value is 1 if the chairman is not served 
by a family member or the ultimate controller; the value is 0 if otherwise.   
Fama (1980), Firstenberg and Malkiel (1980), and Weisbach (1988) have mentioned that a 
higher ratio of outside directors on the board increases the supervisory power of the board 
and is positive for firm value. Beasley (1996) finds a negative relation between increase in 
the number of outside directors and occurrence of financial statement error and fraud. This 
finding suggests that the presence of more outside directors can help increase the reliability of 
accounting information. In this paper, we calculate the ratio of outside directors in each firm 
and sort all the values into ascending order, so that we can convert each of them into a 
percentile value of OUTBOD between 0~1. Sivaramakrishnan and Yu (2008) indicate that 
firms with more independent directors have better corporate governance. We set the presence 
of independent directors (IND) as a dummy variable, which is coded 1 if independent 
directors or supervisors are present on the board and 0 if otherwise. Finally, we sum the 
values of the four variables, namely BODSIZE, DUALITY, OUTBOD, and IND to form a 
composite board composition index (CG-BOD). The value of this variable ranges between 0 
and 4. Higher values indicate higher effectiveness of the board.   
Ownership Structure. Three variables of ownership structure are considered, including ratio 
of shares held by board members (BSHOLD), deviation of control rights and cash flow rights 
(DEV), and equity pledge ratio of directors and supervisors (PLEDGE). Dechow, Sloan, and 
Sweeney (1996) and Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest that when directors or supervisors 
hold a high ratio of shares of the firm, they will be more motivated by a high correlation 
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between their financial risk and the firm’s performance to monitor the management. In this 
paper, we sort all the ratios of board ownership in ascending order to compute the percentile 
for each firm, so that the value can be further converted into a BSHOLD value between 0~1. 
Deviation of control rights and cash flow rights (DEV) is the difference between control 
rights and cash flow rights of the ultimate controller. It can be used to measure the quality of 
a firm’s corporate governance (Claessens, Djankov, & Lang, 2000; La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 2002). If DEV is large, controlling shareholders can 
control the firm with a small cash flow and there may be a stronger incentive for them to 
embezzle the firm’s assets and expropriate minority shareholders. Therefore, a larger DEV 
leads to worse corporate governance. We sort all the values of difference between control 
rights and cash flow rights in descending order and compute their percentiles, so that each 
value can be transformed into a DEV value between 0~1. Values closer to 1 indicate better 
corporate governance.   
According to Kao, Chiou, and Chen (2004) and Yeh, Lee, and Woidtke (2001), a higher 
equity pledge ratio of the board suggests that directors and supervisors are highly involved in 
the stock market and have collateralized their holdings in exchange for cash. There will be a 
smaller incentive for the directors and supervisors to manage the firm properly, and ethical 
crisis is likely to occur. Therefore, higher pledge results in worse corporate governance. We 
sort all the pledge ratios in descending order and compute the percentile of each ratio to 
obtain a PLEDGE value between 0~1 for each firm. Values closer to 1 indicate better 
corporate governance. We sum the values of BSHOLD, DEV, and PLEDGE to get a 
composite ownership structure index (CG-OWN). The values will range between 0~3, and the 
greater the value, the better the corporate governance. Finally, we add up the board 
composition index (CG-BOD) and the ownership structure index (CG-OWN) to form a 
composite corporate governance index (CGI). This index ranges from 0 to 7. This index 
denotes the strength of corporate governance mechanisms, so the higher the index, the better 
the corporate governance.   
3.3.4 Control Variables 
The control variables in this study include cash flow (CF), investment opportunity (Q), and 
firm size (SIZE). Both Grundy and Li (2010) and Richardson (2006) have found a positive 
relation between cash holdings and investment expenditure. Hence, cash flow should be 
controlled. Besides, firms tend to invest more when they can have more investment 
opportunities. Most previous studies use Tobin’s Q as a proxy for investment opportunity 
(Chen, Ho, Lee, & Yeo, 2000; Polk & Sapienza, 2009; Richardson, 2006). Tobin’s Q is the 
ratio between the market value and replacement value of the total assets. As replacement 
value of firm assets is not accessible, we use the book value of firm assets instead (Chung & 
Pruitt, 1994). Finally, firm size is controlled, and the total assets at the beginning of the year 
is used as a proxy for firm size.   
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Table 1. Variables Description 
Variable Symbol Variable Description and Definition 
Variables in the primary model: 
New investment INVEST The sum of all outlays on capital expenditure, acquisitions 
and research and development less receipts from the sale 
of property, plant and equipment minus amortization and 
depreciation expense 
Over investment OVERINVEST The residual from regression (5) 
Sentiment indexes 
 
SENTI The first principal component of the correlation matrix of 
TURNt-1, DACCRt-1, CCIt-1 and NIPOt-1. 
Corporate governance 
composite indexes 
CGI The sum of BODSIZE, DUALITY, OUTBOD, IND, 
BSHOLD, DEV and PLEDGE. 
Cash flow CF The sum of income before extraordinary items and 
depreciation and amortization 
Tobin’s Q Q The market value of total assets deflated by the book 
value of total assets 
Firm size SIZE Total assets measured at the start of the year. 
Variables in the over-investment model: 
Growth GROWTH Change of prime operating revenue divided by prime 
operating revenue at the beginning 
Leverage LEVERAGE The sum of the book value of short term and long term 
debt deflated by the sum of the book value of total debt 
and the book value of equity. 
Cash CASH The balance of cash and short term investments deflated 
by total assets. 
Firm age Ln(AGE) Logarithm of the number of years since incorporation. 
Firm size Ln(SIZE) Logarithm of total assets. 
Stock return STOCK RETURN The market-adjusted stock returns. 
Investor Sentiment Variables 
Turnover ratios TURN The ratio of trading volume to outstanding shares of the 
firm. 
Discretionary accruals DACCR  DACCR୧,୲ = ACCR୧,୲ − NORMALACCR୧,୲ 
ACCR୧,୲ = ∆NCCA୧,୲ − ∆CL୧,୲ − DEP୧,୲ 
NORMALACCR୧,୲ =
∑ ACCR୧,୲ି୩ହ୩ୀଵ
∑ SALES୧,୲ି୩ହ୩ୀଵ
SALES୧,୲ 
Where: 
△NCCA is the change in noncash current assets. 
△CL is the change in current liabilities minus the change 
in debt included in current liabilities and minus the change 
in income taxes payable. 
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Table 1. Variables Description (Continued) 
Variable Symbol Variable Description and Definition 
  DEP is depreciation and amortization expense. 
SALES is net sales of firms. 
Consumer Confidence 
Index 
CCI CCI is calculated based on the survey results provided by 
the Research Center for Taiwan Economic Development, 
National Central University.  
The number of IPOs NIPO The number of IPOs in year t. 
Corporate Governance Variables 
Board size 
 
 
BODSIZE All the total numbers of directors on the board are sorted 
in descending order before computing the percentiles. 
Each percentile is converted into a value between 0~1. 
Chairman internalization DUALITY A dummy variable which is coded one if the chairman is 
not served by the ultimate controller or a family member 
and zero if otherwise.  
The percentage of 
outside directors 
OUTBOD All the ratios of outside directors are sorted in ascending 
order before computing the percentiles. Each percentile is 
converted into a value between 0~1.  
Presence of independent 
directors or supervisors 
IND A dummy variable which is coded one if the board has 
independent director(s) or supervisor(s) and zero if 
otherwise.  
The composite board 
composition index 
CG-BOD The sum of BODSIZE, DUALITY, OUTBOD and IND. 
Board ownership ratio BSHOLD All the ratios of shares held by board members to shares 
outstanding are sorted in ascending order before 
computing the percentiles. Each percentile is converted 
into a value between 0~1.  
The deviation of control 
rights and cash flow 
rights 
DEV All the differences between control rights and cash flow 
rights of the ultimate controller are sorted in descending 
order before computing the percentiles. Each percentile is 
converted into a value between 0~1.  
Equity pledge ratio of 
the board 
PLEDGE All the pledge ratios are sorted in descending order before 
computing the percentiles. Each percentile is converted 
into a value between 0~1.  
The composite 
ownership structure 
index 
CG-OWN The sum of BSHOLD, DEV and PLEDGE. 
This table provides description and definition of the variables. 
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4. Empirical Results and Analysis 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
The descriptive statistics for the main variables are presented in Table 2. Panel A shows the 
average new investment is $636 million, and the abnormal investment ranges between 
$-151,749 million~$368,091 million. Panel B shows the data of proxies for investor 
sentiment. The mean turnover (TURN) is 211.44%, and the mean value of discretionary 
accruals (DACCR) is $-67.13 million. The difference between the minimum and the 
maximum of each variable is large, suggesting that investor sentiment varies greatly from 
firm to firm. At the market level, CCI values fall between 54.49~78.53, and the number of 
IPOs (NIPO) ranges between 34.00~124.00. The principal component analysis shows that the 
mean of the composite investor sentiment index (SENTI) is 0, with a standard deviation of 
1.33. Overall, CCI values fall between 0~100, and the mean value of discretionary accruals is 
negative, suggesting that investors are slightly pessimistic during the sample period.   
Panel C presents the data of variables of corporate governance. The mean composite board 
composition index (CG_BOD) is 1.69 (on a scale of 0 to 4). Among the elements of this 
index, the mean board size (BODSIZE) is 6.83, the mean DUALITY is 0.19, meaning only 
19% of the firms do not have the chairman duality problem. In other words, most sample 
firms are run by a manager who is also the controlling shareholder or a family member of the 
controlling shareholder and likely to have the agency problem. The mean ratio of outside 
directors is 34%, which is not high. Besides, 43% of the firms have independent directors and 
supervisors. The mean composite ownership structure index (CG_OWN) is 1.66 (on a scale of 
0 to 3). Among the elements of this index, the mean ownership ratio (BSHOLD) and pledge 
ratio (PLEDGE) of board members are 23.38% and 9.48% respectively. The maximum 
deviation of control rights and cash flow rights (DEV) reaches as high as 90.62%. The sum of 
the composite board composition index (CG_BOD) and the composite ownership structure 
index (CG_OWN) is the composite corporate governance index (CGI). The theoretical range 
of this value is between 0~7. The worse firm in the sample has 0.41 on this index, and the 
best has 6.64.  
4.2 Investor Sentiment and New Investment 
Table 3 examines how investor sentiment is related to new investment with sentiment indexes 
as independent variables, new investment as dependent variable, and cash flow, investment 
opportunity, and firm size as control variables. The data employed in this research are panel 
data. As shown in Equation (1)~(4), we conduct OLS with year dummies controlled, fixed 
effect regression with and without time effect, and random effect regression respectively to 
increase the robustness of the results. Empirical results indicate that sentiment indexes are 
positively related to new investment at 1% significance level. Therefore, Hypothesis 1 is 
supported. That is, higher optimism of investors leads to more new investment. Due to the 
consideration of equity financing cost or the incentive to cater to investor sentiment (Baker et 
al., 2003; Polk & Sapienza, 2009), managers may increase their firm’s new investment when 
investors are optimistic about their firm. Among the control variables, cash flow (CF) is 
significantly and positive related to new investment in the fixed effect regression model. 
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Tobin’s Q is also significantly and positively related to new investment. As mentioned earlier, 
managers invest more to increase firm value when they spot good investment opportunities 
for the firm. Total assets and new investment are significantly and positively related. New 
investment also increases relatively with firm size.  
 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Median Maximum
Panel A: Investment variables and control variables 
INVEST (million) 636 6,948 -111,834 52 381,619
OVERINVEST (million) 0 6,643 -151,749 -139 368,091
CF (million) 1,730 9,041 -26,494 211 229,476
SIZE (million) 17,799 585,940 32 3,827 1,380,532
Q 0.73 0.74 -0.63 0.55 11.82
  
Panel B: Investor sentiment variables 
TURN (%) 211.44 194.17 0.07 154.57 1581.29
DACCR (million) -67.13 3,116.94 -94,772.25 -10.35 41,446.21
CCI 68.04 8.48 54.49 68.75 78.53
NIPO (Number of IPO firms) 62.96 28.82 34.00 52.00 124.00
SENTI 0.00 1.33 -3.57 -0.41 2.51
  
Panel C: Corporate governance variables 
CG_BOD 1.69 0.79 0.00 1.80 3.95
BODSIZE (Number of 
seats) 
6.83 2.33 2.00 7.00 27.00
BODSIZE (0-1) 0.62 0.30 0.00 0.56 1.00
DUALITY 0.19 0.39 0.00 0.00 1.00
OUTBOD (%) 34.08 21.23 0.00 37.50 100.00
OUTBOD (0-1) 0.45 0.29 0.00 0.47 1.00
IND 0.43 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00
CG_OWN 1.66 0.60 0.18 1.72 2.99
BSHOLD (%) 23.38 13.83 0.00 19.97 94.95
BSHOLD (0-1) 0.45 0.28 0.00 0.42 1.00
DEV (%) 5.29 9.31 0.00 1.31 90.62
DEV (0-1) 0.54 0.32 0.00 0.52 1.00
PLEDGE (%) 9.48 18.16 0.00 0.00 100.00
PLEDGE (0-1) 0.68 0.41 0.00 1.00 1.00
CGI 3.35 1.07 0.41 3.39 6.64
N 7,745 
This table presents summary statistics for the dependent and independent variables. Variable 
description is specified in Table 1. 
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Table 3. Investor Sentiment and New Investment 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 OLS Fixed Effects Random Effects 
SENTI t 2870.72*** 303.97*** 4328.99*** 237.05*** 
 (3.09) (5.96) (4.80) (4.81) 
CF t 0.02 0.04* 0.02 0.00 
 (1.50) (1.78) (0.93) (0.15) 
Q t-1 233.90** 455.24*** 350.03** 366.39*** 
 (2.37) (3.32) (2.34) (3.09) 
SIZEt 0.05*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.07*** 
 (23.07) (20.90) (21.09) (22.65) 
INTERCEPT -6,644.27*** -1,172.87*** -10,009.71*** -702.89*** 
 (-3.35) (-8.89) (-5.21) (-3.73) 
Year dummies Yes No Yes  
N 7,745 7,745 7,745 7,745 
R2 0.18 0.09 0.09  
The table examines how investor sentiment is related to new investment. The dependent 
variable is new investment (INVEST). The independent variables include sentiment index 
(SENTIt), cash flow (CFt), Tobin’s Q (Qt-1)) and firm size (SIZEt). Detailed definitions of the 
variables are given in Table 1. T-statistics (for OLS and fixed effects models) or Z-statistics 
(for random effects model) are reported below the estimated coefficients. The symbols ***, 
**, and * denote statistical significance at 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels 
respectively. 
 
4.3 Investor Sentiment and Over-Investment 
Table 4 examines the relation between investor sentiment and over-investment through four 
models, including OLS with year dummies controlled, fixed effect regressions with and 
without time effect, and random effect regression. The empirical findings indicate that the 
higher the sentiment index, the larger the over-investment. For instance, in the fixed effect 
model with time effect, an increase of sentiment index by 1 causes an increase in 
over-investment by $7,537 million. If investors are overly optimistic, managers may increase 
firm investment due to market timing or an incentive to cater to investor sentiment. The 
increased investment is likely to become over-investment. Conversely, if investors are overly 
pessimistic, under-investment is likely to occur. The results offer support for Hypothesis 2, 
that is, higher investor optimism leads to more over-investment. Among the control variables, 
Tobin’s Q is significantly and positively related to abnormal investment in some models, 
implying that over-investment is more likely to occur when there are more investment 
opportunities. Besides, firm size is positively related to over-investment.   
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Table 4. Investor Sentiment and Over-Investment 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 OLS Fixed Effects Random Effects 
SENTI t 4,114.26*** 231.68*** 7,537.18*** 153.44*** 
 (4.34) (4.35) (8.02) (2.99) 
CF t 0.02 0.01 -0.02 -0.02 
 (1.43) (0.50) (-0.98) (-0.90) 
Q t-1 -2.34 293.71** 274.96* 170.03 
 (-0.02) (2.05) (1.76) (1.39) 
SIZEt 0.03*** 0.06*** 0.07*** 0.05*** 
 (12.76) (16.26) (17.17) (16.12) 
INTERCEPT -9,167.71*** -1,376.87*** -16,811.22*** -830.12*** 
 (-4.53) (-9.99) (-8.39) (-4.44) 
Year dummies Yes No   Yes  
N 7,745 7,745 7,745 7,745 
R2 0.07 0.05 0.06  
The table examines how investor sentiment is related to over-investment. The dependent 
variable is over-investment (OVERINVEST). The independent variables include sentiment 
index (SENTIt), cash flow (CFt), Tobin’s Q (Qt-1)) and firm size (SIZEt). Detailed definitions 
of the variables are given in Table 1. T-statistics (for OLS and fixed effects models) or 
Z-statistics (for random effects model) are reported below the estimated coefficients. The 
symbols ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent 
levels respectively. 
 
4.4 Investor Sentiment, Corporate Governance, and Investment Decisions 
In order to examine whether corporate governance can mitigate the impact of investor 
sentiment on investment decisions, we include the interaction term between corporate 
governance indexes and sentiment indexes in the regression equations. Table 5 shows 
whether board composition moderates the relationship between investor sentiment and 
investment decisions. The empirical results of Equation (1)-(4) indicate that the interaction 
term between board composition (CG_BOD) and investor sentiment (SENTI) is significantly 
and negatively related to new investment (INVEST). In other words, the higher the board 
composition index, the less that investor sentiment will positively affect new investment. 
Firms with a better board structure can more effectively monitor managers’ decision-making 
and reduce the adverse impact of investor sentiment on their investment decisions. On the 
other hand, the results of Model (5)-(8) indicate that the interaction term between board 
composition (CG_BOD) and investor sentiment (SENTI) is also significantly and negatively 
related to over-investment (OVERINVEST). In other words, if there is a high level of investor 
optimism, the better the board composition, the more effectively that the board can monitor 
managers and prevent them from over-investing only to cater to investor sentiment or because 
of the availability of free cash flow. The board plays a central role in corporate governance. 
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The board is responsible for monitoring managerial performance, preventing conflict of 
interests, and ensuring compliance of firm operations with various laws. If the board has a 
better composition, it can exert its monitoring function more independently and efficiently. 
As a result, the impact of investor sentiment that causes inefficient allocation of resources 
and harms the interest of shareholders can be effectively mitigated. 
Table 6 includes the interaction term between ownership structure (CG_OWN) and sentiment 
indexes (SENTI) to examine whether ownership structure moderates the relationship between 
investor sentiment and investment decisions. The results of Equation (1) ~ (4) indicate that 
the interaction term of CG_OWN and SENTI is significantly and negatively related to new 
investment (INVEST). The results of Equation (5) ~ (8) indicate that the interaction term of 
CG_OWN and SENTI is also significantly and negatively related to over-investment 
(OVERINVEST). In other words, better ownership structure can mitigate the impact of 
investor sentiment on new investment and over-investment. The ownership structure index 
(CG_OWN) measures the incentive effects of corporate governance mechanisms. Higher 
board ownership ratios indicate a higher alignment of board interest to shareholder interest, 
and there is a stronger incentive for the board to monitor managerial decisions. A high pledge 
ratio of the board means that board members have collateralized most of their shares in 
exchange for cash. Thus, there is a weak incentive for them to monitor managerial decisions. 
Besides, equity collateralization will deepen the connection between the personal finance of 
board members and the firm’s stock price, offering an incentive for board members to 
encourage firm investment that results in a stock price increase. Finally, higher deviation 
between control rights and cash flow rights (DEV) offer an incentive for the controlling 
shareholder to expropriate minority investors. Such incentive can be reduced if DEV is low. 
Therefore, the quality of ownership structure concerns the incentives for monitoring and 
expropriation. Our empirical evidence confirms that the better the ownership structure, the 
more effectively that managers’ investment decisions can be monitored, and the smaller the 
incentive for expropriation will be. Better ownership structure can help mitigate the adverse 
impact of investor sentiment on investment that concerns the long-term value of the firm. 
Finally, based on the board structure index (CG_BOD) and the ownership structure index 
(CG_OWN), we analyze whether the overall quality of corporate governance (CGI) can 
moderate the relation between investor sentiment and investment decisions. As shown in 
Table 7, the interaction term between SENTI and CGI is significantly and negatively related 
to both new investment (INVEST) and over-investment (OVERINVEST). In other words, the 
higher the composite corporate governance index (CGI), the more that the impact of investor 
sentiment on new investment and over-investment can be mitigated. The results in Table 5~ 7 
supports Hypothesis 3 and Hypothesis 4, which assert that better corporate governance 
mechanisms can mitigate the impact of investor sentiment on new investment and 
over-investment (under-investment) respectively. To sum up, investor sentiment influences a 
firm’s investment level, even to the extent of over-investment or under-investment; the effect 
of investor sentiment can be mitigated if better corporate governance mechanisms are present.
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Table 5. Investor Sentiment and Investment Decisions – The Moderating Effect of Board Composition 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Dependent variable =INVEST  Dependent variable =OVERINVEST 
 OLS Fixed Effects Random Effects  OLS Fixed Effects Random Effects 
SENTI t 3,166.65*** 710.12*** 4,579.49*** 686.74***  4,401.99*** 667.62*** 7,781.53*** 629.64*** 
 (3.40) (5.94) (5.06) (5.95)  (4.63) (5.35) (8.25) (5.24) 
CG_BODt 276.44*** -298.07 -317.08 223.90  375.42*** -283.19 -234.85 303.96** 
 (2.95) (-1.51) (-1.60) (1.53)  (3.93) (-1.37) (-1.14) (2.05) 
CG_BODt*SENTI t -275.91*** -260.76*** -281.50*** -283.46***  -269.38*** -279.92*** -264.02*** -298.45*** 
 (-3.91) (-3.75) (-3.99) (-4.27)  (-3.74) (-3.86) (-3.59) (-4.32) 
CFt 0.02 0.04* 0.02 0.00  0.01 0.01 -0.02 -0.02 
 (1.24) (1.78) (0.96) (0.01)  (1.09) (0.50) (-0.96) (-1.06) 
Qt-1 184.50* 474.14*** 372.10** 361.63***  -66.44 314.07** 295.76* 158.48 
 (1.85) (3.46) (2.49) (3.05)  (-0.65) (2.19) (1.90) (1.30) 
SIZEt 0.05*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.07***  0.03*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.05*** 
 (23.27) (21.25) (21.45) (22.93)  (13.19) (16.63) (17.47) (16.44) 
INTERCEPT -6,834.13*** -754.07** -9,300.54*** -1,174.27***  -9,486.07*** -988.45*** -16,265.97*** -1,440.42*** 
 (-3.44) (-2.12) (-4.75) (-3.70)  (-4.68) (-2.66) (-7.98) (-4.52) 
Year dummies  Yes No Yes   Yes No Yes  
N 7,745 7,745 7,745 7,745  7,745 7,745 7,745 7,745 
R2 0.18 0.09 0.10   0.07 0.05 0.06  
This table examines whether board composition moderates the effect of investor sentiment on new investment and over-investment. The 
independent variables include sentiment indexes(SENTIt), board composition indexes (CG_BODt ), cash flow (CFt), Tobin’s Q (Qt-1), firm 
size (SIZEt) and the interaction term of board composition indexes and sentiment indexes (CG_BODt * SENTIt). Detailed definitions of the 
variables are given in Table 1. T-statistics (for OLS and fixed effects models) or Z-statistics (for random effects model) are reported below 
the estimated coefficients. The symbols ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels 
respectively. 
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Table 6. Investor Sentiment and Investment Decisions – The Moderating Effect of Ownership Structure 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Dependent variable =INVEST  Dependent variable =OVERINVEST 
 OLS Fixed Effects Random  OLS Fixed Effects Random 
SENTI t 3,256.86*** 1,229.41*** 4,764.68*** 972.77*** 4,840.38*** 1,113.92*** 7,930.40*** 824.72*** 
 (3.47) (8.06) (5.28) (6.58) (5.06) (6.99) (8.43) (5.36) 
CG_OWNt 245.84** 213.56 208.82 229.05 681.13*** 390.95 395.48* 522.44*** 
 (2.00) (0.93) (0.91) (1.25) (5.44) (1.63) (1.65) (2.79) 
CG_OWNt*SENTI t -194.26** -563.27*** -538.62*** -448.26
*** -155.54* -537.80*** -482.45*** -409.35*** 
 (-2.15) (-6.44) (-6.15) (-5.29) (-1.69) (-5.89) (-5.28) (-4.64) 
CFt 0.02 0.04* 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.02 -0.02 
 (1.35) (1.67) (0.92) (0.00) (0.96) (0.39) (-1.00) (-1.07) 
Qt-1 235.73** 437.51*** 339.48** 357.42*** -4.75 273.91* 262.13* 158.84 
 (2.39) (3.20) (2.28) (3.02) (-0.05) (1.91) (1.69) (1.31) 
SIZEt 0.05*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.07*** 0.03*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.05*** 
 (23.05) (21.50) (21.61) (22.99) (13.62) (16.86) (17.66) (16.61) 
INTERCEPT -7,207.59*** -1,567.97*** -9,466.07*** -1,115.76*** -11,300.38*** -2,066.27*** -16,679.46*** -1,738.95*** 
 (-3.54) (-3.86) (-4.83) (-3.06) (-5.46) (-4.87) (-8.16) (-4.72) 
Year dummies Yes No Yes  Yes No Yes  
N 7,745 7,745 7,745 7,745 7,745 7,745 7,745 7,745 
R2 0.18 0.09 0.10  0.07 0.06 0.07  
This table examines whether ownership structure moderates the effect of investor sentiment on new investment and over-investment. The 
independent variables include sentiment indexes (SENTIt), ownership structure indexes (CG-OWN t ), cash flow (CFt), Tobin’s Q (Qt-1), firm 
size (SIZEt) and the interaction term of ownership structure indexes and sentiment indexes(CG-OWN t * SENTIt). Detailed definitions of the 
variables are given in Table 1. T-statistics (for OLS and fixed effects models) or Z-statistics (for random effects model) are reported below 
the estimated coefficients. The symbols ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels 
respectively. 
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Table 7. Investor Sentiment and Investment Decisions –The Moderating Effect of Corporate Governance 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Dependent variable =INVEST  Dependent variable =OVERINVEST 
 OLS Fixed Effects Random  OLS Fixed Effects Random Effects 
SENTI t 3,498.15*** 1,335.07*** 4,931.71*** 1,199.68***  4,879.97*** 1,275.33*** 8,112.15*** 1,116.57*** 
 (3.74) (7.92) (5.45) (7.40)  (5.12) (7.24) (8.60) (6.62) 
CGIt 243.14*** -13.57 -28.39 236.80**  436.97*** 63.50 84.40 379.12*** 
 (3.50) (-0.09) (-0.20) (2.18)  (6.17) (0.42) (0.56) (3.44) 
CGIt*SENTI t -212.33
*** -321.98*** -326.08*** -298.01***  -199.00*** -326.10*** -301.22*** -296.74*** 
 (-4.17) (-6.41) (-6.42) (-6.21)  (-3.84) (-6.21) (-5.69) (-5.94) 
CFt 0.02 0.04* 0.02 -0.00  0.01 0.01 -0.03 -0.02 
 (1.12) (1.70) (0.93) (-0.09)  (0.76) (0.40) (-1.00) (-1.19) 
Qt-1 193.52* 471.18*** 372.25** 355.64***  -73.29 308.82** 293.86* 147.65 
 (1.95) (3.44) (2.50) (3.00)  (-0.73) (2.16) (1.89) (1.21) 
SIZEt 0.05*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.07***  0.03*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.05*** 
 (23.34) (21.60) (21.74) (23.23)  (13.83) (16.94) (17.73) (16.85) 
INTERCEPT -7,355.65*** -1,244.53** -9,244.85*** -1,622.35***  -10,824.03*** -1,706.78*** -16,505.24*** -2,233.97*** 
 (-3.66) (-2.47) (-4.65) (-3.86)  (-5.28) (-3.25) (-7.97) (-5.27) 
Year dummies Yes No Yes   Yes No Yes  
N 7,745 7,745 7,745 7,745  7,745 7,745 7,745 7,745 
R2 0.18 0.09 0.10   0.07 0.06 0.07  
This table examines whether corporate governance mechanisms moderate the effect of investor sentiment on new investment and 
over-investment. The independent variables include sentiment indexes (SENTIt), corporate governance composite indexes (CGIt ), cash flow 
(CFt), Tobin’s Q (Qt-1), firm size (SIZEt) and the interaction term of corporate governance composite indexes and sentiment indexes (CGIt * 
SENTIt). Detailed definitions of the variables are given in Table 1. T-statistics (for OLS and fixed effects models) or Z-statistics (for random 
effects model) are reported below the estimated coefficients. The symbols ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1 percent, 5 percent, 
and 10 percent levels respectively.
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5. Conclusions 
The contemporary research of behavioral finance suggests that managerial decision-making is 
influenced by investor sentiment. The fluctuation of investor sentiment can affect a firm’s 
investment levels through the equity financing channel or the catering channel. Investment 
decisions that are not made through careful assessment for optimal investment are 
disadvantageous to firm value and shareholder interest. The purpose of this paper is to 
investigate the impact of investor sentiment on investment decisions, including the amount of 
new investment and over-investment, and further examine whether corporate governance can 
mitigate this impact.    
Empirical results show that higher investor optimism leads to more new investment and 
over-investment, supporting the argument that investor sentiment has an adverse impact on 
investment decisions. Previous research has documented that such adverse impact mainly 
stems from the agency problem. Generally, a manager's performance is evaluated primarily 
by the firm’s stock price. Their concern of personal performance, salary or compensation 
may drive them to seek maximization of the firm’s stock price within a short time (Grundy & 
Li, 2010). Therefore, when investors are optimistic, managers may make decisions that can 
cause a short-term boost of the firm’s price to cater to investor sentiment. However, such 
decisions are likely to result in over-investment. On the other hand, when investors are 
optimistic, the cost of equity financing can be lower. Managers are likely to obtain more 
finance than needed. The excessive cash flow will reduce the efficiency of firm management 
and investment, causing over-investment (Harford, 1999; Jensen, 1986; Opler, Pinkowitz, 
Stulz, & Williamson, 1999, 2001). All these problems can affect a firm’s resource allocation 
and jeopardize the interest of the firm and shareholders.   
Finally, the empirical evidence confirms that corporate governance can mitigate the adverse 
impact of investor sentiment on investment decisions. In the presence of sound corporate 
governance mechanisms, the impact of investor sentiment on new investment and 
over-investment is smaller. Sound corporate governance mechanisms can motivate board 
members to perform their monitoring function, reduce controlling shareholders’ expropriation 
intention, and supervisor firm decisions effectively and independently. In the presence of 
sound corporate governance mechanisms, managers will be less likely to be motivated by 
self-interest to overly cater to investor sentiment or by market timing considerations to 
acquire too much cash flow that results in a waste of resources or over-investment. In order to 
increase firm value, firms should reinforce their corporate governance mechanisms, 
strengthen the monitoring function of the board, and improve the effectiveness of their 
ownership structure to inhibit self-serving or opportunistic behavior of managers and mitigate 
the adverse impact of investor sentiment on their investment decisions. 
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